Adaptive Adaptive firms utilize emerging customer and market insights and. Garvin, D. A. What is contemporary Organisational Behaviour? What were the challenges of such a situation? Many different types of boundaryless organizations exist. 4 What is contemporary organizational behavior? This frees them up to make decisions faster, but it makes it harder to cooperate. Trait Approaches to Leadership, 10.4 What Do Leaders Do? Chapter 1: Introduction to Principles of Management, Chapter 2: Personality, Attitudes, and Work Behaviors, Chapter 3: History, Globalization, and Values-Based Leadership, Chapter 4: Developing Mission, Vision, and Values, Chapter 7: Organizational Structure and Change, Chapter 10: Leading People and Organizations, Chapter 12: Communication in Organizations, Chapter 16: Strategic Human Resource Management, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Journal of Management, 18, 267294. If they can work on their own, they may thrive in a contemporary organizational structure such as a flat or flatter company. Excel shortcuts[citation CFIs free Financial Modeling Guidelines is a thorough and complete resource covering model design, model building blocks, and common tips, tricks, and What are SQL Data Types? Thexis, 3, 2326. By setting up a structure where failure is tolerated and risk taking is encouraged, the company took a big step toward becoming a learning organization. A team may combine members of the engineering, marketing and software departments, sharing their skills to complete a project. Starbucks has immediate brand-name recognition in this cold coffee drink, but its desire to capture shelf space in supermarkets required marketing savvy and experience that Starbucks did not possess at the time. Matrix structures are created in response to uncertainty and dynamism of the environment and the need to give particular attention to specific products or projects. Define boundaryless organizations. Deutschman, A. The diagram below will give you an idea of what a divisional organization looks like. In a matrix, each employee reports to two or more managers. On the other hand, larger companies require more intense frameworks to ensure that operations run smoothly. For such companies, a matrix organization is the most suitable. Tip The five contemporary organization theory models are population ecology, resource dependence, contingency, transaction cost and the institutional model. Forbes ranks America's largest charity and non profit organizations. As technology advances, so too do the options for modern business cards. Academy of Management Executive, 9(3), 718. Because multiple managers are in charge of guiding the behaviors of each employee, there may be power struggles or turf wars among managers. Contemporary designs would include team structure, matrix structure, project structure, boundaryless organization, and the learning organization. Other uncategorized cookies are those that are being analyzed and have not been classified into a category as yet. By setting up a structure where failure is tolerated and risk taking is encouraged, the company took a big step toward becoming a learning organization (Deutschman, A., 2005). Academy of Management Journal, 29, 536561. What is contemporary organizational behavior? Contemporary Forms of Organizational Structures Learning Objectives Explain what a matrix structure is and the challenges of working in a structure such as this. It means that every employee receives tasks and is accountable to a particular superior. As an example, Starbucks formed a highly successful partnership with PepsiCo to market its Frappuccino cold drinks. Contemporary theory is a group of modern literary criticism approaches, such as feminist criticism and psychoanalytic criticism. Traditional designs include simple structure, functional structure, and divisional structure. IBM is a company that has no difficulty coming up with new ideas, as evidenced by the number of patents it holds. In a hierarchical organizational structure, employees are grouped and assigned a supervisor. 3 What is meant by contemporary management? Decision-Making Theory 4. This can work with experienced employees, but the larger the company gets, the more it's likely to need some sort of hierarchy. aka AAB, Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade; Abdullah Azzam Brigades in the Land of Al Sham, history assessed as disbanded; formed around 2005 as a Sunni jihadist group with ties to al-Qaida; formally announced its presence in a 2009 video statement while claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel; in 2013, became involved in the Syrian War where it fought against Iranian-backed forces, particularly Hizballah; has been largely dormant over the past several years and in 2019 announced that it was disbanding, goals rid the Middle East of Western influence, disrupt Israel's economy and its efforts to establish security, and erode Shia Muslim influence in Lebanon, leadership and organization Sirajeddin ZURAYQAT (var: Siraj al-Din Zreqat, Siraj al-Din Zuraiqat) was AAB's spiritual leader, spokesman, and commander; was divided into regionally based branches representing fighters in southern Lebanon (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions), the Gaza Strip (Marwan Hadid Brigade), and Syria, areas of operation was based in Lebanon and operated chiefly in Lebanon; was also active in Gaza and Syria, but announced in November 2019 that its forces Syria were dissolving, targets, tactics, and weapons principal targets were Shia Muslims, the Shia terrorist group Hizballah, and Israel; was responsible for several car and suicide bombing attacks against Shia Muslims in Beirut, Lebanon; claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks against Israel and Lebanon; members were typically armed with small arms, light machine guns, grenades, rockets, and improvised explosive devices, strength was estimated to be down to a few dozen members prior to disbanding, financial and other support funding support is unknown but probably received donations from sympathizers and engaged in smuggling contraband, including weapons, designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 30 May 2012, aka al-Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement); al-Harakat-ul al-Islamiyah; Bearer of the Sword; Father of the Executioner; Father of the Swordsman; International Harakatu'l Al-Islamia; Lucky 9; Islamic State in the Philippines; Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters, history formed in 1991 when it split from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; has carried out dozens of attacks in the Philippines; linked to al-Qaida in the 1990s and 2000s; in recent years, the group has focused on local violence and criminal activity, especially kidnap-for-ransom operations; some factions have declared allegiance to the Islamic State and have had a large role in the operations of ISIS-East Asia (ISIS-EA) in the Philippines, including the attack on Marawi City in 2017; ASG fighters affiliated with ISIS-EA were reportedly linked to suicide attacks in 2019 and 2020 in Jolo, Sulu province; the commander of an ASG faction, Hatib Hajan SAWADJAAN, was the acting leader of ISIS-EA until his reported death in mid-2020; continued to be active into 2022, despite considerable losses to counter-terrorism operations by Philippine security forcesgoals establish an Islamic State in the southern Philippines and ultimately across Southeast Asia, leadership and organization - leadership fragmented; loosely structured and family/clan/network-based; factions tend to coalesce around individual leaders; Sulu-based Radullan SAHIRON (aka Putol, Kahal Mohammad) reportedly became the leader in 2017; SAHIRON has not pledged allegiance to ISIS, areas of operation the southern Philippines, especially Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi islands and their surrounding waters, as well as Mindanao; also has been active in Malaysia, targets, tactics, and weapons - targets military and security personnel, facilities, and checkpoints; also attacks civilian targets, such as churches, markets, and ferry boats; conducted the countrys deadliest terrorist attack when it bombed a ferry boat in Manila Bay in 2004, killing 116 people; known for kidnapping civilians, particularly foreigners, for ransom and has killed hostages when ransoms were not paid; tactics include car bombings, ambushes, complex assaults involving dozens of fighters, beheadings, and assassinations, as well as possible suicide bombings; has conducted acts of piracy in local waters; weapons include small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, landmines, and improvised explosive devices, strength assessed in 2022 to have less than 200 armed fighters, financial and other support funded primarily through kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extortion; makes financial appeals on social media; may receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers; has received training and other assistance from other regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya; buys weapons and ammunition from corrupt local government officials or smuggles them in from nearby countries, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1997, aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion; al-Aqsa Brigades; Martyr Yasser Arafat; Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa; The Brigades; al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs' Group; Martyrs of al-Aqsa Group, history emerged at the outset of the second intifada in September 2000 as a loosely-organized armed wing of Yasser ARAFAT's Fatah faction in the West Bank; in 2002, some members splintered from Fatah while others remained loyal; the group carried out suicide attacks against Israeli targets between 2001-2007; most of the groups leaders have been captured or killed by Israel; following an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) after the HAMAS takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel pardoned some AAMB fighters in return for an agreement to disarm; after a trial period, those that disarmed were absorbed into PA security forces while those that refused were targeted by PA security forces; still others formed splinter groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades-Nidal al-Amoudi Division and the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza; some factions participated in operations against Israeli targets through the 2010s, including the Stabbing Intifada of 2015-16, as well as periodic rocket attacks in 2017-2018; claimed responsibility for an attack in 2022 by a gunman that killed 5 near Tel Aviv, goals drive the Israeli military and Israeli settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah, leadership and organization most of the groups original leaders have been captured or killed by Israel; typically has operated under a decentralized power structure, with each cell/faction reporting to a local leader and mostly acting independently of each other, areas of operation Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank; has members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, targets, tactics, and weapons primarily employed bombing and small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers after the second intifada began in September 2000, but by 2002 had turned increasingly to attacks against civilians inside Israel, including the first female suicide bombing; since 2010, has launched numerous rocket attacks against Israeli communities; largest attack was in November 2012, when it fired more than 500 rockets into Israel during Israeli military operations in Gaza; fighters typically armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, grenades, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rockets, strength estimated in 2020 to have a few hundred members, financial and other support Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, mostly through Hizballah facilitators; has cooperated with other terrorist groups throughout its existence, including Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 27 March 2002, aka - Saraya al-Ashtar; the military arm of the al-Wafa Islamic movement, history is an Iranian-backed Shia militant group established in 2013 with the aim of overthrowing the ruling Sunni family in Bahrain; in 2018, formally adopted Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding in its logo and flag and reaffirmed the groups loyalty to Tehran; has not claimed any attacks in recent years, but reportedly still active through 2021, goals foment an insurgency against the ruling Sunni family of Bahrain and, ultimately, replace it with a Shia-based government; also seeks to expel US and other Western military forces from Bahrain, leadership and organization Qassim Abdullah Ali AHMED (aka Qassim al Muamen) is the Iran-based leader of AAB; operates in cells, areas of operation located in Bahrain; also active in Iran and Iraq, targets, tactics, and weapons targets local security forces in Bahrain and plotted to attack oil pipelines; also has promoted violence against the British, Saudi Arabian, and US governments; methods include shootings and bombings; equipped with small arms and explosives, including improvised explosive devices, funding and other support receives funding, training, and weapons support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps; also receives training from the Iraq-based Kataib Hezbollah terrorist group, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 11 July 2018, aka al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqiun bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion (or Brigade); Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; al-Murabitoun; The "Sentinels" or "Guardians", history was part of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but split from AQIM in 2012 over leadership disputes; merged with the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa to form al-Murabitoun in August 2013; some members split from the group in mid-2015 and declared allegiance to the Islamic State, which acknowledged the pledge in October 2016, creating the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; in late 2015, al-Mulathamun/al-Mourabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM and in 2017, joined a coalition of al-Qaida-affiliated groups operating in the Sahel region known as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); the group remained active in 2022 under the JNIM banner, goals replace regional governments with an Islamic state, leadership and organization unclear; Mokhtar BELMOKHTAR or Abderrahman al-SANHADJI (BELMOKHTAR has been declared killed several times since 2013); operations guided by a governing shura council but details on the sub-structure are not available areas of operation Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger, targets, tactics, and weapons primarily targets Western interests in the Sahel but also regional military forces; known for high-profile attacks with small arms and explosives against civilian targets frequented or run by Westerners, including restaurants, hotels, mines, and energy facilities; in 2013, claimed responsibility for taking over 800 people hostage during a four-day siege at the Tiguentourine gas plant in southeastern Algeria, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians; has claimed responsibility for suicide car bombings at military bases in Niger and Mali, including a suicide car bombing attack on a military camp in Gao, Mali, that killed at least 60 and wounded more than 100; has been involved in fighting against French military and local security forces in Mali; armed with small arms, machine guns, landmines, mortars, and improvised explosive devices, strength not available; dated information suggests a few hundred, financial and other support engages in kidnappings for ransom and smuggling activities; receives support through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region; acquired weapons from Libya, battlefield captures, and seized stockpiles from local militaries, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 December 2013, aka Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; Hayet Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hayat, history formed circa late 2011 when former al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI sent Syrian militant Abu Muhammad al-JAWLANI (var: al-GOLANI, al-JOLANI) to organize al-Qa'ida cells in Syria; split from AQI in early 2013 and became an independent entity; operated as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham briefly in 2016; in 2017, joined with four smaller Syrian Islamist factions (Harakat Nur al Din al Zenki, Liwa al Haqq, Ansar al Din, and Jaysh al Sunna) and created Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, "Assembly for the Liberation of the Levant") as a vehicle to advance its position in Syria; since 2017, additional groups and individuals have joined; as of 2022, HTS was the dominate militant group in northwest Syria and asserted considerable influence and control over the so-called Syrian Salvation Government in the Iblib de-escalation zone where it continued to defend against attacks from Syrian Government forces and its allies and consolidate its position; maintained a tense relationship with al-Qa'ida affiliate in Syria Hurras al-Din (HAD) and refused efforts to resolve differences; has reportedly detained or killed some HAD leaders; has openly clashed with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and regularly detained ISIS members seeking to use Idlib as a safehaven, goals unify under its banner the various anti-ASAD jihadist groups operating in Syria and consolidate its control over the Idlib region; ultimately oust Syrian President Bashar al-ASAD's regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state, leadership and organization led by an overall commander (al-JAWLANI) assisted by a small consultative council (majlis-ash-shura); has branches for political, religious, military, financial, civilian services, media, and administrative affairs; operational structure varies from clandestine cells to paramilitary/semi-conventional military units organized as battalions and brigades; claims to have 10 brigades, each with the ability to operate independently with its own infantry, armor, supply, and fire support units; reportedly operates a commando unit known as the "Red Bands" or "Band of Deaths" that is responsible for conducting raids behind regime front lines, areas of operation headquartered in Syria's Idlib Province in the northwest, operationally active primarily in northwestern Syria after regime advances cleared opposition groups from other areas of the country, targets, tactics, and weapons primarily attacks Syrian Government and pro-regime forces (including Iranian-backed) and other Syrian insurgent groups, including ISIS, as well as some minorities and civilians; engages in conventional and guerrilla-style attacks using small arms and other light weapons, artillery, rockets, landmines, anti-tank missiles, armored combat vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles; also known for using terrorist tactics, including assassinations and suicide attacks incorporating car bombs and explosive vests, strength assessed in 2022 to have as many as 15,000 fighters, financial and other support derives funding from smuggling, extortion, taxes and fines on local populations and at border crossings it controls, and donations from external Gulf-based donors; taxes imposed on local populations include income, business, and services and utilities such as access to electricity, water, and bread; also raises funds through control of the import and distribution of fuel through a front company; has conducted kidnappings-for-ransom operations in the past; maintains training camps and provides some logistical support to like-minded groups; has also reportedly received military training from private foreign contractors, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 15 May 2014; on 31 May 2018, the Department of State amended the designation of al-Nusrah Front to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other aliases, aka al-Qaeda; al-Qaeda; Qaidat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qaidat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Ladin Network; the Usama Bin Ladin Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad, history formed under Usama BIN LADIN (UBL) circa 1988 and now one of the largest and longest-operating jihadist organizations in the world; helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s; in the 1990s, was based in Sudan and then Afghanistan, where it planned and staged attacks; merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001; developed a reputation for carrying out large-scale, mass casualty attacks against civilians; has lost dozens of mid- and senior-level operatives to counterterrorism efforts, including UBL in May 2011, which has disrupted operations but the group continues to recruit, plan, inspire, and conduct attacks; has established affiliated organizations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and its contemporary strength is primarily in these affiliates; tied to the Taliban in Afghanistan and remained active there into 2022, goals eject Western influence from the Islamic world, unite the worldwide Muslim community, overthrow governments perceived as un-Islamic, and ultimately, establish a pan-Islamic caliphate under a strict Salafi Muslim interpretation of sharia; direct, enable, and inspire individuals to conduct attacks, recruit, disseminate propaganda, and raise funds on behalf of the group around the world; destabilize local economies and governments by attacking security services, government targets, and civilian targets; maintain its traditional safe haven in Afghanistan; establish and maintain additional safehavens elsewhere, leadership and organization not available; Sayf al-'Adl possibly the group's current de facto leader; Ayman al-ZAWAHIRI, who was selected to lead following UBL's death, was killed in 2022; has a leadership council (majlis al-shura); al-Qaida reportedly maintains branches for military, security, political, religious, financial, and media affairs; affiliates have separate emirs (leaders) and organizational structures that vary by region, areas of operation based in South Asia (core members in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan); employs an affiliate or proxy model, which includes al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa and the Sahel), Hurras al-Din (Syria), al-Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan); has supporters, sympathizers, and associates worldwide, including in Asia, Europe, North America, and South America; maintains a strong online presence and individuals inspired by AQs ideology may conduct operations without direction from its central leadership; opportunistically enters (or secures the allegiance of participants in) local conflicts, targets, tactics, and weapons considers its enemies to be Shia Muslims, US and Western interests, so-called "apostate" governments (such as Saudi Arabia) perceived to be supporting the US and the West, and the Islamic State; leader ZAWAHIRI has encouraged followers to attack European (particularly British and French), Israeli, NATO, Russian, and US targets, specifically military bases and forces; targets have included embassies, restaurants, hotels, airplanes, trains, and tourists sites; employs a combination of guerrilla warfare hit-and-run and terrorist tactics against security and military forces; known for use of suicide bombers, car bombs, explosive-laden boats, and airplanes; conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, which involved 19 operatives hijacking and crashing four US commercial jetstwo into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvaniakilling nearly 3,000 people, strength as of 2022, it was estimated to have several hundred operatives in Afghanistan; the organization remained a focal point of inspiration for a worldwide network of affiliated groups and other sympathetic terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, the Haqqani Network, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, financial and other support primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters and from individuals, primarily in the Gulf States; uses social media platforms to solicit donations and has been channeled funds through cyberfinancing campaigns; has received some funds from kidnapping for ransom operations; historically has acquired money from Islamic charitable organizations; also recruits followers through social media, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 8 October 1999note - has some ideological and tactical similarities with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and the groups typically operate in the same conflict zones, but the relationship is mostly adversarial, and they compete for resources and recruits, and often clash militarily, aka al-Qaida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida in Yemen; al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQY; Ansar al-Sharia; Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; National Hadramawt Council, history formed in January 2009 when the now-deceased leader of al-Qaida (AQ) in Yemen, Nasir AL-WAHISHI, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qaida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP; the announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia; beginning in 2014-2015, AQAP was able to take advantage of Yemens civil war and expand operations in the country, controlling a large portion of the southern part of the Yemen by 2016"; after 2017, the group began losing territory and fighters, as well as leaders, to internal dissensions, desertions to ISIS, and casualties from Yemeni and international military operations and fighting with ISIS and the Huthis; however, in 2022 the group continued to occupy territory, conduct attacks, and pose a significant threat in Yemen, goals establish a caliphate and a government/society based on sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East; support the broader goals of AQs central leadership, leadership and organization led by Khalid bin Umar BA TARFI (aka Abu Miqdad al-Kindi); has a leadership council (majlis al-shura) comprised of lieutenant commanders who are responsible for overall political direction and military operations; organized in branches or wings for military operations, political, propaganda (recruitment), and religious issues (for justifying attacks from a theological perspective while offering spiritual guidance), areas of operation most active in southern and central Yemen; probably has a limited presence in Saudi Arabia, targets, tactics, and weapons chiefly targets Security Belt Forces and other groups affiliated with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the Shabwa and Abyan governorates, as well as the Huthis in the Bayda governorate; also targets Yemeni Government officials, oil facilities, merchant ships, and Shia Muslims; has targeted Western interests, including embassies, diplomats, business people, tourists, and airliners; has waged open warfare with Islamic State elements in Yemen since 2018; employs guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, complex assaults, assassinations, snipers, bombings, and suicide attacks; equipped with small arms, machine guns, artillery, rockets, landmines, anti-tank missiles, armored combat vehicles, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), and improvised explosive devices, including car bombs, road side bombs, and suicide vests, strength estimated 2-3,000 in 2022, down from as many as 6-7,000 in 2018, financial and other support receives funding from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnapping-for-ransom operations, and donations from like-minded supporters; for nearly a year after seizing the city of Mukallah in April 2015, had access millions of dollars from port fees and funds stolen from the central bank; many of its weapons have been seized from the Yemeni military; recruits through social media, print, and digital means, designation placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 January 2010. aka al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, Qaedat al-Jihad, Jamaat Qaidat al-Jihad fi'shibhi al-Qarrat al-Hindiya, history al-Qa'ida leader Dr. Ayman al-ZAWAHIRI announced AQIS's inception in a video address in September 2014; the group claimed responsibility for a September 2014 attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi in an attempt to seize a Pakistani warship; since the assault, the group has conducted a limited number of small attacks on civilians, but has not publicly claimed any attacks since 2017, although some members fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban; suffered some losses to counter-terrorism operations in 2020-2022; in September and October 2021, the group released two propaganda videos specifically targeting India and Kashmir, and in mid-2022 threatened to conduct suicide bombings in several Indian cities; has strong ties to Lashkare Tayyiba (LeT) and a rivalry with the Islamic State's Khorasan branch goals establish an Islamic caliphate in the Indian subcontinent; support the broader goals of al-Qaidas central leadership, leadership and organization Usama MAHMOOD (alt.
Alvin Purple Filming Locations,
Slane Slimaky Z Kysnuteho Cesta,
Articles L